I. Summary
The Battle of Borodino, September 7, 1812: This battle often appears the high point of the campaign, a misleading label. The battle ends in stalemate, leaving the French free to advance on Moscow just 72 miles to the east, but also marching to their doom. Napoleon occupied Moscow on September 14, 1812; he remained there a month. When the French retreated and headed back west, so began the harrowing trek of the Grande Armée, its destruction assured and complete in but six weeks—the time to move from Moscow to Kovno, or just about where the French had begun their attack some five months before on June 24, 1812. In the intervening period of time, the vast French army of close to 600,000 troops was reduced to a mere 85,000 men, none ready to fight anymore. The disaster had been swift and comprehensive. The ill-tidings for Napoleon were such that he would lose his throne in April 1814, merely 21 months after initiating the attack on Russia.
The constant campaigning, indeed, from 1812, 1813, and into 1814, underscores the limited role Borodino played in reversing French fortunes. The battle itself represents a familiar refrain: Napoleon with the initiative but electing to launch a frontal attack into the teeth of the enemy defenses. One could suggest that the Russian position was unremarkable, with no genuine terrain characteristics to enhance the defenses. In fact, the flèches and the Great Redoubt make this clear, crude earthworks elected to better bolster the middle of the line. In this respect, Napoleon may well have surmised the fortifications were a sign of weakness, and so launched his attack in this direction. When he did so, he forfeited the French Army’s ability to maneuver. Certainly, Marshal Davout suggested this course of action, recommending a sweeping envelopment of the Russian left flank. Instead, Napoleon invited a slugfest.
The fighting commenced early, the French exhausting themselves in a series of heroic if costly attacks from 0600 to 1000. Russian resistance was as heroic. By that point, the fighting hit something of a lull as the French recoiled and the Russians shifted forces to meet this threat to the center. The next stage of the battle revived French fortunes, given the losses to this point had zapped their combat power. To meet the French attack, the Russians moved a great concentration to the center of the line, a supreme target for Napoleon’s artillery. Over the next several hours, French batteries devastated the Russians guarding the center, and a tipping point appeared possible and in favor of the French. A renewed French attack may well have breached the center, and Marshall Ney made this appeal directly to Napoleon, asking for the Imperial Guard. Napoleon refused, barking, “I will not demolish my Guard.” Ney offered his own retort, decrying that decision with the words, “since he’s no longer a general…let him go back to the Tuileries and leave us to be the generals for him.” In this dissension, the battle raged amidst a few more limited French attacks, ending the day with both sides locked in place.
The costs had been enormous. Of the French Army, only some 100,000 remained fit for action; 30,000 lay killed, wounded, missing. The Russians faced a similar total: a force anywhere from 120,000 to 140,000 lost 40,000 men, a staggering and in many ways crippling blow. Worse, on both sides, many senior officers were killed or wounded. The Russians suffered a further loss of Prince Bagration, commander of the 2nd Army, killed in action. The carnage tested both sides and the ability to sustain cohesion. Moreover, the losses reflected the clumsy attack frontage of the French, but also the vast use of artillery: 587 French guns, 620 Russian guns. This concentration of firepower and reliance on that branch of service heralded another Napoleonic staple of the increasing use of artillery. By 1812, the Napoleonic battle (campaign) of maneuver was a distant memory in light of this battle and those before: Wagram, Friedland, Eylau, Austerlitz. Napoleon appeared to have grown one-dimensional as he grew senior and in command of larger and larger armies. There were more such battles to come, but none would favor the French emperor with decisive victory.
Borodino, for these reasons, does represent a turning point in this campaign, and for this reason it points to decisive results. But the totality of the campaign, and its relation to 1813, 1814, again marginalizes its significance. The age of decisive battle had taken another hit, as the master of arms faced repudiation as he waged war on his own terms. The French retreat out of Russia meant this Russian Campaign of 1812 was a turning point in Napoleon’s fortunes. Explaining what it meant for war itself now became a paramount consideration.
The wargame captures the slugfest that punctuated the battle. This outcome mostly stems from the propensity of ‘exchange’ results on the CRT. I assume the slow mass of French combat power reflects the early stages of the battle. On September 5, 1812, Napoleon stormed the Russian forward position of the Schevardino Redoubt. This costly exchange—some 5,000 casualties on each side—foretold what was to come in the next days. In the game, the shift from this early engagement to the French effort to strike the Russian center appears seamless. In reality, the two engagements suggested parallels to the French attack on Smolensk 16-18 August: The French attacked that city after delaying one day again to mass combat power. The Russians withdrew in that period of delay. Napoleon, at Borodino, risked this flight once again. He may well have struck the center of the Russian position given his fear of a Russian withdrawal; he might catch them attempting to withdraw, an eventuality that would favor a French assault. While this nuance is missing, the need for a grinding attack and defense comes across. How quickly to assault the Schevardino Redoubt sets the tone of the entire game—so a good capturing of the history.
The battle witnessed a Russian cavalry attack on the French left to the northwest of Borodino. This strike panicked the French briefly; Eugene then blunted the attack. In the game, how best to do something similar is perhaps an opportunity. To the French right, the Russian left, the single road traversing the forest concentrations is easily interdicted, more defended, by the Russians. That, in fact, was much the case, Ponatowski’s V Corps striking in this direction only to be stymied by determined Russian resistance benefiting from the attack frontage restriction. The result, in the game and in reality, was a bitter fight for the center, and corresponding losses therein.
II. Bibliography
Assessments of the battle in English are few; many books address Borodino as part of the Russia campaign of 1812. Below represents a good place to get started. Chandler’s treatment of the battle in his important study merits attention. However, as Napoleon’s fortunes decline in war, so too does Chandler’s interest in assessing the great general. And so, his successes get much more treatment than his failures. Borodino starts this process of emphasis. Esposito/Etling present a very good graphic/map depiction of the battle, and in but a few pages. They reach interesting conclusions given the brevity of the study. Mikaberidze is a more recent treatment. Not much changes even as Mikaberidze, a native Georgian, uses Russian sources to engage a more complete story. His book represents very good battle history. Cate’s chapter, even if via a commercial press, offers a very good rendition of the battle. Altogether, these sources ground one in the battle; they also warn of the need to expand the study beyond strictly English sources.
Cate, Curtis. “Borodino.” In The War of the Two Emperors: The Duel Between Napoleon and Alexander, Russia 1812. New York, NY: Random House, 1985. Pp. 223-252.
Chandler, David. “Borodino.” In The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1966. Pp. 790-810.
Esposito, Vincent J and John R. Etling. A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars. London: Greenhill Books, 1964. Pp. 116-118.
Mikaberidze, Alexander. The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2007. Pp. 276.
III. Order of Battle, Borodino
One other source to consider: this link offers a comprehensive order of battle.
mjf/March 2025